

Writing a Concise, Neutral, Assertive Position Paper on Dutch Monarchical Security Risk, Succession, and Youth-Centred Democratic Legitimacy

Executive summary

This report synthesises the legal baseline in the Dutch constitutional monarchy, recent credible reporting and security-system analyses relevant to threats against the royal family, and three philosophical lenses—socialist, anarchist, and democratic—into a drafting framework for a concise, neutral, yet assertive position paper. It treats the “security compromised” premise as an unspecified, time-uncertain contingency rather than an established fact, and therefore prioritises governance continuity, lawful transitions, public legitimacy, and harm minimisation. ¹

Legally, the Dutch Constitution provides a tightly specified line of succession (limited to relatives within the third degree of consanguinity) and multiple continuity mechanisms: regency for minority or incapacity, temporary transfer of royal authority, and a fallback role for the Council of State if no regent/monarch can exercise authority. These mechanisms are designed to avoid a vacuum even under acute disruption. ²

On the threat environment, mainstream reporting since September–October 2022 indicates serious organised-crime-related threats affecting the heir and (in some reporting) the then prime minister; official bodies and police typically decline to discuss protective arrangements. Independent and official analyses of the broader “bewaken en beveiligen” system emphasise the trade-offs between secrecy, investigation, and protective action, and highlight governance frictions (information “silos”, accountability gaps, capacity pressure) that matter for any high-profile security crisis—including one involving constitutional heads of state. ³

Philosophically, the three lenses converge on one operational lesson: legitimacy under stress is strengthened when authority is (a) accountable and limited, (b) cognitively open to evidence, and (c) socially distributed—so that continuity does not depend on a single person’s safety. A position paper can be both neutral and assertive by separating (i) constitutional facts, (ii) security-risk reasoning under uncertainty, (iii) normative commitments about equality and participation, and (iv) a menu of lawful, contingency-ready options that are auditable and youth-inclusive. ⁴

Constitutional and legal baseline for monarchy, succession, and regency in the Netherlands ⁵

Core constitutional architecture and responsibility rules

The Dutch constitutional system places the monarch within a government formed by “the King and the ministers”, while simultaneously establishing that the King is inviolable and ministers are responsible. This is a central drafting point for neutrality: operational governance responsibility—especially crisis

response and security policy—sits primarily with the ministerial chain, not with the monarch personally.

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The Constitution further requires that the monarch be sworn in and inaugurated in the capital, Amsterdam 7, in a public joint session of parliament, swearing loyalty to the Constitution; this is a continuity ritual that doubles as a legitimacy anchor in a transition scenario. 8

Succession rules and legal constraints that matter under security disruption

The official line of succession is anchored in constitutional rules on hereditary succession and degrees of consanguinity. The Constitution restricts eligibility to successors who are not more than third-degree relatives of the monarch. 9

A legally salient constraint for any “successor readiness” discussion is parliamentary control over dynastic continuity through consent requirements. Under the Constitution, the monarch (and—per official Royal House guidance—members in line) can lose succession rights by marrying without parliamentary consent. 8

The Constitution also contains “exceptional circumstances” mechanisms: it allows exclusion from succession by law in exceptional circumstances (with a heightened threshold and specific initiation requirements), and it provides a special process for appointing a successor if none exists, including dissolution and a two-thirds requirement in a joint session. These are not everyday tools; they are designed for edge cases and can be analysed as last-resort stabilisers rather than routine political instruments. 8

Regency, incapacity, and “no-vacuum” provisions

A security-compromise scenario becomes constitutionally operational if it plausibly impacts the monarch’s ability to exercise royal authority. The Constitution provides two distinct routes:

First, the cabinet may trigger an incapacity pathway: if the Council of Ministers judges the King unable to exercise royal authority, it informs parliament with the advisory opinion of the Council of State 10; the States General 11 then decides in joint session whether the King is unable to exercise authority, and a later law declares restoration if capacity returns. 12

Second, the King may temporarily relinquish royal authority, but only under an Act of Parliament introduced “by or on behalf of him”, and in a joint session procedure. This route is structurally useful for “temporary, security-driven de-risking” because it can be framed as precautionary continuity rather than as incapacity or abdication. 13

In multiple scenarios—minority of the monarch, incapacity, temporary relinquishment, unborn heir, and gaps in succession—the royal authority is exercised by a regent, appointed by law. Importantly, where incapacity or temporary relinquishment occurs, the Constitution makes the heir presumptive regent by operation of law if they are at least eighteen. This is the constitutional hinge for a “daughter-as-successor/stand-in” scenario that is lawful and continuity-oriented. 13

If, for any reason, royal authority is not otherwise provided for, the Council of State exercises it temporarily until a monarch or regent is designated—an explicit anti-vacuum mechanism relevant to extreme security contingencies. 13

Pre-designated regency under Kingdom law

Beyond the Constitution, a Kingdom Act (Rijkswet) has pre-designated a regent for the case in which a lawful descendant becomes monarch while under eighteen: it appoints Queen Máxima ¹⁴ as regent for that minority period, with Prince Constantijn ¹⁵ as successor-regent if needed, and it repeals an earlier 1981 regency designation law. This is a concrete example of advance contingency planning embedded in law. ¹⁶

Protective security architecture and protocols relevant to royal protection

“Bewaken en beveiligen” as a system, not an ad hoc reaction

Dutch protective security is structured as a “task field” that combines person protection, local-domain security, and protection of objects and services; it is framed explicitly as a preventive system aimed at averting attacks under serious threat conditions. ¹⁷

The system is described (in official and quasi-official materials) as a combination of legal bases and inter-agency working arrangements. In 2026, a renewed circular formalised a “stelsel beveiligen van personen” with clearer central authority arrangements and a triage mechanism for inclusion. ¹⁸

Central roles and decision logic under the 2026 circular framework

The 2026 circular states that the purpose of the “stelsel beveiligen van personen” is to provide resistance against serious threats to physical integrity. It explicitly groups threats into four phenomenological categories: organised/subversive crime, terrorism and extremism, state actors, and fixated lone individuals. This taxonomy is suitable language for a neutral position paper because it avoids speculation about specific perpetrators while still being analytically actionable. ¹⁹

The same circular sets out a governance idea pivotal for lawful “sink-or-swim” planning: a single, central authority over security measures for persons within the system, assigned to NCTV ²⁰, in order to avoid conflicts between protective objectives and criminal investigation/prosecution objectives. ²¹

It also states that some objects and sites—including royal palaces—may be guarded and secured by Royal Netherlands Marechaussee ²² under NCTV authority, illustrating that “royal security” is treated as part of national protective infrastructure rather than merely private household security. ¹⁹

Operational protection delivery and confidentiality norms

At the delivery layer, the police describe personal protection as “customised” per assignment, with measures such as route/location checks referenced as examples. The same public-facing materials reflect an explicit norm of not discussing the details of protective arrangements. These two features—tailored protection plus confidentiality—should shape the drafting style: a position paper can argue for accountability and readiness while explicitly rejecting operational detail. ²³

The security intelligence environment also matters. The AIVD ²⁴ publicly frames its remit as protecting national security and democracy against evolving threats, and recent reporting highlights persistent intimidation and threats against public officials more broadly—contextually relevant to how protective resources and threat assessments are prioritised. ²⁵

Threat landscape, with sources and dates, relevant to King Willem-Alexander ²⁶ and Princess Catharina-Amalia ²⁷

What can be said responsibly from public sources

Public sources support three high-confidence statements that can be used in a position paper without speculation:

First, credible reporting in October 2022 indicates that the Princess of Orange was placed under heightened security due to concerns she could be targeted by criminals; the reporting also notes that police and intelligence services declined to discuss protective arrangements. ²⁸

Second, reporting and later follow-up indicate that the security situation materially constrained her ability to live a normal student life, and that adaptive arrangements (including time spent outside the Netherlands) were used to manage risk. ²⁹

Third, the broader Dutch protective-security system has faced scrutiny and reform pressure after lethal attacks on protected individuals in other contexts; analyses point to friction between secrecy/investigation imperatives and the information needs of protection operations, plus gaps in oversight and evaluative learning. Even when not specific to the Royal Family, these findings are relevant to any claim that “security is compromised”: they show plausible failure modes are systemic (governance, information flow, capacity), not solely personal. ³⁰

Short survey of salient public reporting and analyses

A neutral-yet-assertive position paper can include a compact “source-and-date” survey that demonstrates due diligence while avoiding sensationalism:

In September 2022, Dutch public reporting described substantially increased protection around the Princess and the then prime minister Mark Rutte ³¹, linked in reporting to signals in organised crime communications; official comments emphasised the gravity of the situation while avoiding details. ³²

On 13 October 2022, Reuters ³³ reported heightened security for the Princess due to concerns about criminal targeting and reiterated that Dutch security and police services declined comment on security arrangements. ³⁴

In February 2023, Dutch reporting recorded the Princess describing the situation as still very difficult, consistent with a prolonged, not merely momentary, threat-management period. ³⁵

In April 2024, Dutch reporting indicated she lived and studied in Madrid for over a year due to the safety situation, and later returned to Amsterdam with security measures allowing more normal life; details remained undisclosed. ³⁶

Independent/academic analysis of “bewaken en beveiligen” risk governance emphasises that threat environments are plural (organised crime, extremism, lone actors, state threats) and that system design choices—central authority, triage, and capacity—shape outcomes. The 2026 circular explicitly encodes this multi-phenomenon threat model and central authority. ³⁷

For contextual national risk, Dutch counterterrorism reporting maintains a high terrorism threat level (level 4: “substantial”) and explains that this implies a real chance of attack; while not royal-specific, this can be used carefully to support arguments for robust continuity planning without implying a particular plot. ³⁸

Socialist, anarchist, and democratic lenses on leadership, succession, youth empowerment, and collective responsibility

Why philosophy is useful in a security-and-succession position paper

In a security-compromise scenario, evidence may be partial and disclosure constrained. A position paper gains rigour by making explicit the normative standards for legitimate action under uncertainty: what counts as justified continuity, what counts as overreach, and how to protect both democratic equality and personal safety. The three lenses below can be integrated without endorsing any party-political actor by treating them as “evaluation frameworks” rather than as partisan programmes. ³⁹

Socialist perspectives

A broad socialist critique targets inherited office and structural inequality, disputing the legitimacy of hereditary privilege as a political principle. In the Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx ⁴⁰ and Friedrich Engels ⁴¹ argue for transforming the social order that reproduces domination across generations (including via inheritance), framing political power as intertwined with economic structure. ⁴²

For a neutral position paper, the practical socialist contribution is not “abolish X now” as an incitement, but two disciplined claims: legitimacy requires accountability to the people rather than lineage, and social solidarity implies collective responsibility for safeguarding anyone put in symbolic roles—including royals—because personal harm destabilises the polity and is morally unacceptable. This can be linked to the state’s positive protective obligations recognised in European rights law and reflected in Dutch security governance discussions. ⁴³

A democratic-socialist inflection can also be drawn from Rosa Luxemburg ⁴⁴, who rejects treating reform and mass political agency as mere technocratic choices and emphasises the political centrality of broad, conscious participation. Used carefully, this supports youth inclusion and civic mobilisation as legitimacy-creating forces, not as extra-legal pressure. ⁴⁵

Anarchist perspectives

Anarchist traditions give particularly sharp tools for analysing “succession” and “security” because both can expand hierarchical authority under fear. Anarchist critiques insist that authority must be bounded and justified, and that freedom is incompatible with obedience to externally imposed command when not grounded in collectively recognised necessity.

Mikhail Bakunin ⁴⁶ famously defines liberty as obedience to “natural laws” recognised by oneself, not externally imposed by human or divine will. Interpreted for modern governance, this supports a position paper that insists on rule-of-law constraints and publicly reasoned necessity claims for exceptional measures. ⁴⁷

Peter Kropotkin ⁴⁸ develops the concept of mutual aid as a condition of social survival and a basis for cooperative, decentralised organisation. This provides an affirmative, non-violent bridge between “security” and “youth empowerment”: safety is not only armed protection, but also resilient social

relations, community support systems, and institutions that distribute competence rather than centralise it. ⁴⁹

A later anarchist-inflected governance model, associated with Murray Bookchin ⁵⁰, advances “libertarian municipalism” and confederal democracy—institutions of local assemblies coordinated without a sovereign centre. Even if not adopted as constitutional replacement, it can inform youth councils and deliberative bodies as parallel legitimacy infrastructures that reduce a polity’s dependency on a single symbolic figurehead. ⁵¹

Democratic perspectives

Democratic theory offers the strongest vocabulary for a neutral yet assertive paper because it formalises legitimacy conditions without requiring ideological maximalism.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau ⁵² grounds legitimacy in popular sovereignty and the “general will”, insisting that the sovereign will cannot be alienated; for a monarchy context, this argues that even if a monarch exists constitutionally, ultimate political legitimacy remains with the people and their lawful institutions. ⁵³

John Stuart Mill ⁵⁴ defends representative government as the “ideally best” form (within his frame) and stresses participatory and educative functions of political involvement—useful for youth empowerment arguments that are framed as capacity-building, not as symbolic consultation. ⁵⁵

A modern, operational set of criteria comes from Robert A. Dahl ⁵⁶, who identifies five standards for democracy: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion of adults. These criteria can be used in a position paper to evaluate each transition option and each youth-governance proposal on transparent, non-partisan grounds. ⁵⁷

Finally, youth empowerment has a directly relevant primary legal anchor in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights ⁵⁸ text of the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 12 establishes a child’s right to express views freely in matters affecting them, with due weight given according to age and maturity. This supports youth participation mechanisms as rights-consistent, not merely discretionary. ⁵⁹

Sink-or-swim tactical analysis for lawful transition and contingency planning

How to write “aggressive but lawful” without incitement

A position paper can be “aggressive” in the sense of being operationally decisive, time-aware, and institutionally demanding—while remaining lawful—by doing four things:

It should specify constitutional triggers and decision points rather than personalities, propose auditable governance reforms rather than clandestine tactics, require evidence thresholds and independent review for exceptional measures, and explicitly refuse operational details of personal protection. This approach aligns with the Dutch system’s own confidentiality norms and the OVV’s observation that overly detailed disclosure can create safety risks and expose methods. ⁶⁰

Option logic under an unspecified threat type and timeline

Because the threat type and timeline are unspecified, the most rigorous approach is scenario planning that is threat-agnostic:

If threat is chronic but manageable, the priority is continuity with reduced exposure and scaled legitimacy-building (including youth inclusion). If threat is acute and mobility-constraining, the priority becomes temporary delegation mechanisms (regency or temporary relinquishment) that reduce single-point-of-failure risks. If threat is escalatory and governance confidence erodes, the priority becomes rapid legal transition (abdication or incapacity declaration) paired with legitimacy reinforcement and protective security surge. ⁶¹

Tactical pathways that are forceful yet legal

A continuity-first pathway is “fortified status quo”: maintain current constitutional arrangements while using ministerial responsibility to expand parliamentary oversight, independent audit of system performance, and structured public communication (bounded by security exceptions). This is supported by the constitutional allocation of responsibility to ministers and by the fact that protective-security governance is already framed as a system with central authority and triage mechanisms. ⁶²

A decisive risk-reduction pathway is “temporary relinquishment with automatic regency”: the King temporarily relinquishes royal authority via an Act of Parliament (joint session), and the heir presumptive becomes regent by operation of law (if eighteen or older). It is aggressive because it swiftly redistributes symbolic exposure and reduces a single-person dependency without permanently changing the constitutional order. It is lawful because it is explicitly provided for. ¹³

A more coercive but still constitutional pathway is “incapacity declaration”: the Council of Ministers initiates the procedure (with Council of State advice) and the States General decide in joint session that the King is unable to exercise authority, triggering regency until restoration is declared by law. This option is high-stakes; its legitimacy depends on demonstrable necessity and on restraint against politicisation. ¹³

A clean-cut pathway is “abdication”: official Royal House guidance notes that the monarch determines the timing of abdication, and Dutch practice has included abdications; succession then follows the constitutional order. Abdication is aggressive because it resolves uncertainty quickly; it is risky because it may merely transfer threat focus to the successor and requires managing a public legitimacy moment (inauguration/investiture) under security pressure. ⁹

A structural pathway is “constitutional reform”: using the Constitution’s revision procedure (two readings with an intervening election, and a two-thirds threshold in the second reading), reforms could narrow the monarchy’s role, alter succession-related provisions, or move toward a republican head-of-state model. This is aggressive structurally but slow procedurally and depends on sustained public legitimacy across an election cycle. ⁶³

Security implications and risk trade-offs

Across all pathways, the central security trade-off is exposure versus legitimacy. Ceremonial visibility sustains symbolic legitimacy but can increase risk; reduced visibility reduces risk but may fuel misinformation and erode trust if not paired with transparent constitutional explanation. The OVV’s analysis of the protective system highlights how lack of clear frames, accountability routes, and

information sharing can degrade outcomes; a position paper can therefore demand governance reforms—oversight, evaluation, and clarity—without disclosing operational measures. ⁶⁴

Positive prognosis and actionable recommendations for youth empowerment with stability and safety

Why youth empowerment is stabilising in a succession-and-security problem

A central argumentative move—compatible with socialist, anarchist, and democratic frames—is to treat youth empowerment as a resilience measure, not merely a representational ideal. Dahl’s democracy criteria explicitly require effective participation and enlightened understanding; these can be operationalised through institutions that train civic competence and inclusion early. ⁶⁵

This is strengthened by Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which grounds participation in rights language rather than discretionary “consultation”. ⁵⁹

Concrete, lawful youth-governance models that fit Dutch institutional reality

A high-feasibility model is to expand and formalise youth councils and youth advisory boards at municipal and national levels. Dutch local law already supports youth councils via municipal ordinances; for example, a municipal “Jeugd- en Jongerenraad” can be established with defined tasks and powers under a council decision based on the Municipalities Act provisions cited in the ordinance record. This demonstrates legal feasibility without requiring constitutional change. ⁶⁶

A second model is structured, evidence-based citizen participation processes, including representative deliberative processes and participatory budgeting. The OECD ⁶⁷ guidelines provide practical design steps and stress that participation should have real impact and accountability. A position paper can propose youth-weighted versions (e.g., youth juries; youth deliberative panels paired with parliamentary committees) to meet the “enlightened understanding” criterion and reduce polarisation. ⁶⁸

A third model is national youth agenda-setting coupled to ministerial accountability. The NJR ⁶⁹ describes a large-scale youth participation trajectory for a National Youth Strategy involving thousands of young people and multiple ministries, and the Netherlands Youth Institute ⁷⁰ reports on this as a policy instrument aimed at translating youth priorities into government action. This can be adapted into a standing “youth impact review” mechanism for major policy shifts during security crises, ensuring youth are not treated as bystanders in decisions that shape their future. ⁷¹

Stability-and-safety oriented recommendations

A stability-forward position paper can recommend, without endorsing parties or individuals, that the government and parliament pre-commit to a published constitutional contingency protocol: a short, public document that explains (in plain language) the triggers and procedures for temporary relinquishment, incapacity declaration, regency, and succession ceremonies, while explicitly excluding operational security details. This improves legitimacy by reducing uncertainty and misinformation. ⁷²

It can also recommend institutionalising independent oversight and appeal/complaint pathways regarding protective-security decisions, consistent with the OVV’s observation that there is no independent body supervising individual cases and limited procedural clarity for protected persons;

while the monarchy is a distinct constitutional category, system-wide improvements reduce the likelihood of “compromised security” emerging from governance failure. ⁷³

Finally, it can recommend “youth civic capacity hardening”: fund and scale programmes that teach threat literacy, democratic participation skills, and safe civic organising, aligning with OECD guidance on lowering barriers and building participation skills, and with Dahl’s “enlightened understanding” criterion. ⁷⁴

Comparative options matrix and transition scenarios


Comparative table of options

Option	Legal basis	Pros	Cons	Key risks	Plausible timeline	Likelihood under unspecified threat
Status quo with strengthened security governance	Ministerial responsibility and inviolability principle; protective-security system under the 2026 circular and NCTV authority. ⁷⁵	Maximises continuity; avoids constitutional drama; can be paired with oversight and youth participation reforms. ⁷⁶	May appear insufficient if threat is severe; ongoing constraints on normal functioning/visibility can erode legitimacy. ⁷⁷	Normalisation of emergency posture; capacity strain; information-friction failures. ⁷⁸	Immediate to months	Medium-High
Regency via temporary relinquishment (precautionary)	Constitution allows temporary relinquishment by Act of Parliament in joint session; regency rules then apply, including heir-as-regent if 18+. ¹³	De-risks single-person dependency; reversible; frames as continuity under caution. ⁷⁹	Requires parliamentary act; may be politicised by opponents as weakness. ¹²	Legitimacy contestation if rationale unclear; successor becomes new focal point for threat. ⁸⁰	Weeks to months	Medium

Option	Legal basis	Pros	Cons	Key risks	Plausible timeline	Likelihood under unspecified threat
Regency via incapacity declaration	Cabinet informs parliament with Council of State advice; joint session declares inability; later law restores. ¹³	Strong constitutional clarity for true incapacity; shifts authority decisively. ⁸¹	Very high political/symbolic cost; should be reserved for demonstrable inability. ¹²	Perceived politicisation; institutional trust damage if contested; escalatory narratives. ⁸²	Weeks to months	Low-Medium
Abdication to successor	Constitution makes provision for abdication in practice; succession follows established ordering; inauguration/investiture in joint session. ⁹	Clean resolution; removes ambiguity; aligns with historical Dutch practice of abdication. ⁸³	Irreversible; successor may face same or higher threat; requires careful public-legitimacy choreography. ²⁸	Rapid legitimacy shock if public perceives coercion; transition event security burden. ⁸⁴	Weeks	Medium
Youth councils and youth deliberative bodies as parallel legitimacy infrastructure	Municipal ordinances can establish youth councils; OECD participation guidance supports deliberative models; youth participation anchored in CRC Article 12. ⁸⁵	Builds long-run resilience and civic competence; reduces overreliance on symbolic roles; can be implemented without constitutional reform. ⁸⁶	Does not itself solve acute head-of-state security; requires sustained political commitment and resourcing. ⁸⁷	Tokenism risk if no policy impact; backlash if framed as “replacement” rather than augmentation. ⁸⁸	Months to 1–2 years	High (as supplement)

Option	Legal basis	Pros	Cons	Key risks	Plausible timeline	Likelihood under unspecified threat
Constitutional reform (monarchy redesign or republic)	Constitution revision requires two readings and an intervening Lower House election; second reading requires two-thirds in both Houses. ⁶³	Addresses structural legitimacy debates; can reduce long-run succession/security tension by redesigning head-of-state model. ⁸⁹	Slow and politically demanding; risk of polarisation during a security crisis. ⁹⁰	Constitutional fatigue; legitimacy fracture if pursued opportunistically under fear. ⁹¹	At least one election cycle; often longer	Low (short term), Medium (long term)

Mermaid flowchart of plausible transition scenarios



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- 1 9 24 40 80 83 **Succession to the throne | Royal House of the Netherlands**
<https://www.royal-house.nl/topics/monarchy/royal-house/succession-to-the-throne>
- 2 6 8 10 12 13 20 22 31 52 56 69 72 **119406 Grondwet_Koninkrijk-NL Nederlands**
<https://open.overheid.nl/documenten/ronl-bfa3c90611c54fd791d929d4b94e0869ee6a7065/pdf>
- 3 28 34 60 77 **<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-crown-princess-amalia-is-receiving-heightened-security-anp-2022-10-13/>**
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/dutch-crown-princess-amalia-is-receiving-heightened-security-anp-2022-10-13/>
- 4 15 46 57 58 65 76 86 89 **newuniversityinexileconsortium.org**
<https://newuniversityinexileconsortium.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Robert-A.-Dahl-On-Democracy-1998-1.pdf>
- 5 74 87 **Taking Action to Achieve Meaningful Citizen Participation**
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/exploring-new-frontiers-in-citizen-participation-in-the-policy-cycle_77f5098c-en/full-report/taking-action-to-achieve-meaningful-citizen-participation_e0665ac3.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- 7 18 19 21 37 61 84 **<https://www.nctv.nl/site/binaries/site-content/collections/documents/2026/02/27/circulaire-bewaken-en-beveiligen-van-personen-objecten-en-diensten-2026/circulaire-bewaken-en-beveiligen-van-personen-objecten-en-diensten-2026.pdf>**
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- 14 27 71 **Nationale Jeugdstrategie**
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- 16 **https://www.eerstekamer.nl/behandeling/20131217/publicatie_wet_2/document3/f%3D/vjfnvqktvnmn.pdf**
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- 23 26 41 **Hoe belangrijke mensen in Nederland worden beveiligd**
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- 25 **Jaarverslag 2024**
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- 29 35 **<https://nos.nl/artikel/2463179-amalia-over-bedreigingen-en-zware-beveiliging-ik-heb-het-nog-steeds-heel-moeilijk>**
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- 30 43 64 70 73 78 82 91 **Bewaken en beveiligen: lessen uit drie beveiligingssituaties**
https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/bewaken_en_beveiligen_lessen_uit_drie_beveiligingssituaties-892429099.pdf
- 32 **<https://nos.nl/artikel/2444910-bescherming-amalia-en-rutte-opgeschroefd-aanwijzingen-voor-aanslagplannen>**
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39 67 79 81 [Regency | Royal House of the Netherlands](https://www.royal-house.nl/topics/monarchy/royal-house/regency)

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48 66 85 [Verordening Jeugd-en Jongerenraad | Lokale wet](https://lokaleregelgeving.overheid.nl/CVDR62725?utm_source=chatgpt.com)

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